在经历了一段时间的拖延后，中国的军事力量-----中国人民解放军，终于开始了对自身的重大改革。这将是自上世纪50年代以来对解放军最具重大意义的一次改革措施，也将会对中国未来的国际行为和全球秩序产生巨大的影响。
After a long delay, China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army, is finally beginning to reform itself in a big way . These reform measures are the most significant changes to the PLA since the 1950s and will have huge implications for China’s future international behavior and global order.

在经历了一段时间的拖延后，中国的军事力量-----中国人民解放军，终于开始了对自身的重大改革。这将是自上世纪50年代以来对解放军最具重大意义的一次改革措施，也将会对中国未来的国际行为和全球秩序产生巨大的影响。

 

Some analysts in China call such reforms a shift to a U.S.-style military from an outdated Soviet model. In a narrow sense, this is exactly China’s goal. The U.S. military, despite its problems, is far more advanced and effective than any other military in the world in terms of its ability to fight and win a modern war. Although, as I have argued elsewhere, China’s PLA can also fight a modern war, its expectation of winning against the U.S. military are not great. One of main reasons is China’s slow and ineffective regional structures. China badly needs a joint operational command in order to win a modern war. These reforms address these shortcomings.

一些中国的分析师把这次改革称为是中国军事力量从苏联模式向美军风格的转变。从狭义上看，这也正是中国的目标。尽管也有自己的问题，美国的军事力量就进行和赢得一场现代战争的能力而言，远比世界上其他军队更先进和高效。即使如此，就像我一直认为的，解放军也能打一场现代战争，但其打赢美国军方的期望并不大。其中一个主要原因就是解放军缓慢低效的军区结构。要赢得一场现代战争，中国迫切需要一个联合作战司令部，而这次改革正是为了解决这些问题。

 

Third, there is still the lingering problem of corruption. It is a consensus among China’s military experts that corruption is the number one killer of the PLA on the battlefield. Before these reforms were announced, the PLA’s Discipline Commission was relatively weak, unable to bring in its own members for justice. Now the Commission directly reports to Xi, which should, in theory, greatly enhance the Party’s ability to fight corruption nationwide.

第三点，挥之不去的腐败问题。腐败是解放军在战场上的头号杀手，这已经是中国军事专家的一个共识了。在这些改革公布之前，解放军的纪律委员会相对较弱，无法有效的维持公正发挥作用，而现在它直接向习主席报告，理论上会极大的增强党在全国范围内打击腐败的执政能力。

In short, these reforms are supposed to address the existing flaws of the PLA and help it emerge as a potent war-fighting force. Once the reforms are completed, we should expect to see a leaner and more lethal PLA, which might or might not be good news for others in Asia. One thing is clear though: every other power must pay serious attention to the PLA’s fighting capabilities.

简而言之，这次改革应该能够解决现有的缺陷，帮助解放军成为一支有效的作战部队。改革完成后，我们应该就能看见一支更精简高效、更致命的解放军，对亚洲其他国家而言，这可能是也可能不是一个好消息。不过有一点是可以明确的：其他国家可要对解放军现在的作战能力足够重视了。
firemagnet 回复 Oro Invictus ? 6 days ago
as some suspected at the time of the parade, the troop cuts had very little to do with any real overtures towards peace, and much more to do with reforming the PLA into a more modern war-fighting organization.

正如同时期关于阅兵的怀疑所说，裁军对于走向和平的影响非常小，而是会使解放军通过这次改革成为一支更加现代化的军队。

http://thediplomat.com/2015/09...
Ms. Tiezzi's commentary was rather prescient. It remains to be seen as to how the PLA will make use of these reforms. That said, absent its tit-for-tat in the South China Sea vs both Vietnam, the Philippines and the US, there is very little that could really be said to be a genuine national interest from the outside looking in. Most of the PRC's "national interests" are decidedly offensive in nature at this time--"blue national soil" and "indisputable sovereignty" readily come to mind.

Tiezzi女士的评论更加明智。解放军会凭借这次改革怎么做还有待观察。也就是说在外界看来不提及中国在南海与越南、菲律宾以及美国的针锋相对很难被称为真正的国家利益。解放军的大多数“国家利益”本质上无疑是进攻性的，很容易想到“蓝色国土”和“不可争辩的主权”

CB 回复 firemagnet ? 6 days ago
I would say restless regions internal to China like Tibet, Xianjing, and suppose I say Taiwan are national interests. Taiwan has massive strategic and political value, whereas the former two contain most of China's minerals, energy, and dare I say land.

我想说中国的动荡地区像是西藏，新疆甚至说台湾才是中国国家利益所在。台湾有着巨大的战略和政治价值，但是前两者牵扯了中国巨大的精力和能量，使中国很难顾及到台湾。

I'm not sure the authors posts from above are inherently contradictory. They show an obvious reversal in opinion, but one could reasonably have mistaken China's rhetoric for reality. And it is really only a small walk back from "China has reduced some countries suspicions.." to "unprecedented...reforms" and "national interest". Any country that watched a military parade where China displayed loads of military hardware, including some of the planets most ambitious missile system designs (I say designs because who knows if these rockets actually fly), and hears the Chinese leader say but we are firing 300,000 of our soldiers, and thinks oh boy, what a relief, is a bit naive for me. The author is not totally in that camp, so long as he recognizes his mistake. My question is, does he?

我不太确定以上作者的文章有内在的矛盾。它展示了作者观念的变化，很明显是被中国的花言巧语迷惑的。从“中国的行为减轻了邻国的怀疑”退后了一小步成了“史无前例的改革”和“国家利益”。任何国家如果仅仅是看过中国那展示了许多新装备，甚至是包括一些雄心勃勃的导弹系统设计(谁知道这些导弹能不能飞上天)的阅兵式，听到了习大大宣布裁军30万就会谢天谢地，感到轻松的话，那就太天真了吧。这个作者（陈定定）并没有完全的投入这个阵营，只要他认识到自己的错误。我的问题是，他会吗？

The dragon has woken. Napoleon warned us. It might not overtake the eagle, or be able to wrestle down the bear, but it will blow fire around the world.

中国龙正在慢慢崛起，拿破仑曾经提醒过我们。中国可能赶超不过鹰酱，打不倒毛熊，但是会在全世界带来混乱。
The obvious question here is why China is reforming its military in such a drastic way. Although there are many possible explanations, one explanation is particularly simple and powerful: China’s existing military organization is not effective enough to defend its national interests in a rapidly changing world."

一个明显的问题是为什么中国要如此激烈的进行一次军事改革。这里有很多的猜测，其中最简单并且最有说服力的一条是：中国现有的军队在这个急速变化的世界中无法有效的保护国家本身的利益。